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BELIEF, PRACTICE, AND GRAMMATICAL 
UNDERSTANDING 
John H. Whittaker 
This essay develops the point that beliefs as well as concepts bear an essen-
tial relation to the practices in which their grammar is expressed. Those 
beliefs that Wittgenstein called "certainties" are the best example, since our 
acceptance of them as such is ingredient in our acquired capacities for 
thinking and judging as we do. But a similar connection between belief and 
behavior can be found in beliefs, especially religious beliefs, that are not 
incumbent on us as reasonable people. Their force belongs to the kind of 
belief that they are, but we implicitly attend to a similar kind of grammati-
cal force when we recognize any kind of belief. It is part of the logic that 
governs our understanding of beliefs and explains why one must comply 
with a religious belief in order to affirm it at all. 
In this paper I want to explore the contentious and often misunderstood 
claim of Wittgenstein that the understanding of language is internally 
related to participation in a practice. I want to defend not only the idea 
that the understanding of concepts depends on a grasp of their use in an 
activity; but more importantly, I want to point out that this same norma-
tive connection between language and practice is important in the under-
standing of beliefs. My eventual focus will be the question of whether or 
not beliefs have a grammar that governs the understanding of not only the 
beliefs themselves, but also of what it means to think of them as true. 
Clarity on this point will aid us in our understanding of beliefs in general, 
but particularly in our understanding of religious beliefs. First, though, we 
need to make sure that we have a common understanding of what gram-
matical understanding is. 
Understanding for Wittgenstein was a capacity. It was the capacity to 
use words in accordance with the unwritten norms that are to be found in 
meaningful speech. Grammar, in fact, simply ~ the set of norms by which 
we distinguish between sensible and senseless uses of a term; e.g., when we 
say that it is meaningless to ask where history is located. How do we know 
that such remarks are meaningless? Because they rub against our intu-
itions? No doubt; but Wittgenstein suggests that these intuitions reflect 
learned patterns that tell us what does and does not make sense in talking 
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about history. These patterns are constitutive of the grammar that governs 
the meaningfulness of our discourse, enabling us to distinguish sense from 
nonsense in our speech and telling us what is conceptually imaginable in 
contrast to what is senseless. The various strictures that grammar places on 
meaning, however, are too elusive to be written down as a set of rules; and 
even if they could be written down, they would require their own unwrit-
ten rules for their application - which is to say that the written rules would 
require their own unwritten grammar. Much of the Philosophical 
Investigations is concerned with this point, and Wittgensteins discussion of 
the matter will not be repeated here. For now, we can simply say that to 
have mastered the grammar of the use of a term is to understand a concept. 
In understanding a concept, we depend on something that resembles the 
knowing-how of observing norms, since this mastery enables us to go on 
speaking grammatical sense in a variety of contexts. 
Before going any further, though, one particular point should be men-
tioned, since it is the source of a common form of misunderstanding. Many 
think that Wittgenstein held the view that grammar, or the normative con-
nection between language and practice, applies only to discrete activities -
that is, only to language-games or forms of life. According to this concep-
tion, language-games and/or forms of life are activities that can be isolated 
from one another in the absence of any particular conceptual focus. Thus, 
the speaking that goes on in these discrete spheres of activity belongs to a 
grammar that is unintelligible to those who do not participate in this activi-
ty. The discourse that is internal to one of sphere of activity cannot be criti-
cized from point of view internal to another. This, though, is far too sim-
plistic. Wittgenstein used the language-game analogy only in an ad hoc way 
that depended on the particular conceptual points at issue. As our concep-
tual interest shifts from one term to another, or from one sense of a term to 
another, so too do the "games" in which we locate the use of the relevant 
terms. Thus, one way of distinguishing between one language-game and 
another might not be useful for making another grammatical point. Given 
the change in the conceptual issues at stake, a completely new way of dis-
tinguishing between" games" might need to be drawn. In short, there is no 
such thing as a language-game simpliciter. The distinction is relative to the 
particular conceptual headaches that Wittgenstein tried to alleviate.' 
To put the point in another way, the distinctions drawn to clarify the dif-
ference between one use of a term and another presume a specific concephl-
al focus. Apart from this focus, the point of distinguishing between one 
grammatical context and another is lost. As William Hyde puts it, "Those 
who accuse Wittgenstein of compartmentalization are wrongly inferring, 
from that fact that something can be distinguished (for whatever purpose) 
from other surromlding things, that something is isolated and cut off from 
these other things - as if the distinguishability of the heart from the aorta 
made the heart isolated and cut off from the aorta."2 D. Z. Phillips has made 
similar points at greater length in Belief, Change and Forms of Life, where he 
points out that the use of a term in one activity - supposedly a different 
language-game - is parasitic on its use in another and thus might, from 
another point of view, be considered part of the same game.3 
Recently James Conant called attention to another distinction that is rel-
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evant here. Wittgenstein said that language-games are all right as they 
stand, and this might suggest, if our practices are compounded of various 
language-games, that these practices lie beyond the possibility of meaning-
ful criticism. But this obviously does not follow, if only because words that 
can be used correctly - i.e., in accordance with the grammar illustrated by 
a language-game - can also be used incorrectly. In other words, both the 
use and the misuse of words belongs to what one might call our practice, 
but the misuse of words, unlike the meaningful use of terms, has no con-
nection with normative usage. It is mere practice, not the normative prac-
tice of meaningful speaking, and so there is nothing to stop such practices 
from being criticized in a variety of ways. In effect, that was what 
Wittgenstein himself was doing when he challenged the sense of much of 
the discourse that passes for philosophical reflection; practicing that sort of 
discourse is pointless, being bereft of the grammatical norms that give the 
relevant terms their sense. Such practice is language "gone on holiday." 
The grammatical practice that the language-game analogy is designed to 
illustrate is a particular kind of practice, the kind that enables the norms that 
govern meaningful speech to be learned. But this kind of practice is always 
surrounded by a larger context of activity that is disconnected to the particu-
lar issues of conceptual understanding at hand, whatever they might be. 
This surrounding practice consists simply of whatever goes on, whereas 
grammatical practice (a Alanguage-game) always illustrates particular nor-
mative activities to illuminate what it makes sense to say. The latter sort of 
practice belongs to the game because it illustrates its something like the rules 
of the game, but this is only one aspect of what is going on in the actual 
activity contexts of speaking. Think of what goes on in the bleachers as a 
ball game is being played, for example. All of this activity belongs to a day 
at the park, but one could not teach baseball by attending to just anything 
that goes on at the park. Nor is there anything that protects this sort of 
grammatically unrelated activity from being criticized. The only thmg that is 
protected from criticism is the rules of baseball B the normatively inscribed 
activity of grammar! 
But my concern, as I said, is to ask whether or not there is an internal 
connection between our practice and our understanding of beliefs, just as 
there is a grammatically-governed practice that exhibits the sense of our 
words. This claim is problematic because we usually say that we under-
stand a belief simply by knowing what it is about, and that makes it seem 
as if the sense of a belief were a function of its representational content. 
Thus, we may say that we can tell a scientific judgment from a religious 
belief because we know what these two different beliefs are about, but how 
does that knowledge tell us that the judgments themselves are different in 
kind, different in their logic? Here we seem to know intuitively that there 
are in-kind distinctions that need to be made about the different beliefs, 
just as we seem to know intuitively that our concepts belong to qualitative-
ly distinct categories (physical objects, mental states, numbers, etc.). I want 
to suggest that both sorts of intuitions have the same ground. In the case of 
beliefs as well as in the case of concepts, the grammatical relation that lan-
guage has to contexts of thought stands behind our ability to draw distinc-
tions m their logical nature. In what follows, I want to develop this point. 
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II 
Ordinarily we think that the activities that we engage in are the conse-
quences of the logically prior beliefs that we hold to be true. What are peo-
ple to do, for instance, if they doubt that they should continue in therapy 
designed to discover an insightful interpretation their dreams? The stan-
dard answer is that one needs first to decide whether dreams have any 
useful content to begin with. The whole premise of dream interpretation 
depends on the assumption that dreams contain potentially valuable infor-
mation about the psyche; and this question, presumably, is a factual mat-
ter. As such, it needs to be addressed prior to engaging in the practice of 
analysis. Perhaps there is nothing to be discovered in dreams except the 
attitudes that we read into them. Perhaps they tell us nothing about the 
workings of the psyche. Whatever the case might be here, it seems people 
need to settle this question before resolving their doubts about whether or 
not to continue the praclice of interpreting their dreams.s 
Expressed in this way, the objection to portraying beliefs as if they were 
internal to, or ingredient in, a practice seems formidable. We have to know 
how things stand, what is true, before we can reasonably decide what to 
do. And yet the idea behind this seemingly obvious idea - that truth 
claims must be adjudicated independently of the roles that they have 
acquired in our practices - is a gross generalization; and those who stand 
w:1failingly by it need to "look and see" if this rule of thumb is always justi-
fied. Often it is true that we demand firmness of belief before acting, but it 
is not true in every case. Below I want to suggest some truth claims that do 
not fit the categorical assumption that practice is always the consequence 
of beliefs that can be assessed independently of practical or personal con-
cerns. Sometimes the affirmation of a belief simultaneously includes a 
change in practice. 
To see how this is so, consider the odd propositions that Wittgenstein 
calls certainties - that the world has a long history, that people do not 
have sawdust in their heads, that people have to breathe to stay alive, etc.6 
It is grammatically unusual to describe these certainties as beliefs at all, 
since they are rarely even formulated. Generally, when we express our 
convictions - when we say "I believe ... " - we do so in recognition of the 
possibility of disagreement. We formulate our convictions to announce 
our stance, to confess our viewpoint, to focus on an issue. The characteris-
tic feature of the claims that Wittgenstein described as certainties, however, 
is that in ordinary circumstances it makes no sense to treat them as contro-
versial. They are too obvious for that, too deeply anchored in our thinking 
for evidence to support, since their truth is as secure as anything that might 
serve them as a ground. As long as extremely unusual circumstances do 
not obtain, giving us a special reason to doubt, these unspoken beliefs 
stand fast, lying apart from the route traveled by inquiry (OC, 88 ). 
Yet if we cannot intelligibly doubt such certainties - if we rarely have 
any reason even to formulate them - how is it that we come to believe 
them? Wittgensteins answer is that we have come to act in ways that show 
confidence about them. When scientists, for example, examine the occipi-
tal lobe for changes in neuronal activity corresponding to perceptual 
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reports, they take it for granted that human beings have brains, that brains 
are vital to bodily sensations, that human beings who are dead show no 
signs of sensation, etc. Thus if you asked such scientists whether all living 
people have brains, they would have a hard time making any sense out of 
your question. Everything that they do, everything that we all do - our 
lives - tell us that this question need not even be put. Its truth is pre-
sumed in the countless ways in which we have come to think and live. 
Imagining a doubt like this is, in fact, rather like imagining a high-level 
debate among officials of the (American) National Football League over 
changing the rules for spotting the ball for point-after-touchdown 
attempts. If in the middle of that discussion, one of the officials were to 
ask, "Does one keep score in football?," the others would be dumbfound-
ed. They would have no idea where such a question could corne from. 
After all, we are talking about people who officiate in football garnes, 
assess penalties, keep track of the clock, judge field goal attempts, etc. 
What sense does it make for one of those people to ask if one keeps score in 
football? Anyone who participates in all of these activities must already be 
certain of that. This certainty is contained in knowing how to play the 
game. It is "swallowed down" in that training (OC,143). 
Some of our beliefs, that is, are silently absorbed in that training wherein 
we learn how to think - i.e., what to doubt, what to rely on, when to ques-
tion, and so fortl1. It is this training that teaches us how to conduct our-
selves as reasonable people in lifes various activities. As we learn to think 
in these many ways, various convictions come to be held in place, not 
because they have been or could be confirmed, but because the complicat-
ed process of raising up other issues as dubious questions includes behav-
ior that swallows them down in wordless confidence. Were it meaningful 
to doubt such truisms, the whole edifice of the relevant reasoning process-
es would collapse. The agreement in behavior that reasoning entails 
would be suspended. Were this to happen, we would no longer know hmu 
to think, where to stand, what facts to trust, what is and is not a good rea-
son for doubt, etc. We would, quite literally, be too disoriented to know 
what to count as thinking at all. 
The point to be stressed here is not so much the anti-skeptical bent of 
Wittgensteins remarks, but the fact that in the case of certainties believing 
and behaving amount to virtually the same thing. One could say, in fact, that 
the behavior of believing - knowing where to stand, what to use as evi-
dence, etc. - simply is being certain about the most rudimentary things. 
Thus, if we go back to the original question - can all truth claims can be 
isolated from practice, as if they were the logically prior conditions for the 
practices in which they figure? - we would have to say no. Corning to 
believe in commonplace certainties is so interwoven with learning how to 
think that their judgment as truth claims cannot be isolated from the criti-
cal practice that we have mastered in learning how to reason. For again, 
the knowing how of reasoning itself entails acting without doubt about 
those things which form the background against we distinguish between 
truth and falsity (~C, 94). 
This is a remarkable conclusion. It means, in effect, that some beliefs -
or some ideas that skeptical philosophers held up as beliefs - are not only 
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introduced by essentially practical training but are secured in the same 
way. It belongs to their logical role that we find such certrunties acceptable 
as reliable truths. Such judgments are not secured by inference, since our 
capacity to make reasonable inferences ultimately depends on a practical 
agreement in which their truth is already subsumed. That learned agree-
ment is what makes good the whole process of inferring. Here it is the 
wordless certainty of our acting that lies at the bottom of a language-game 
(OC, 110,204). 
III 
One reason why it is so difficult to accept the idea that the truth of cer-
tainties might be established in the way that behaviors are learned is that 
we think of all beliefs as being made true or false by objective matters of 
fact. Rather than being a function of our practice, we tend to think that 
their truth or falsity depends on their correspondence with the external 
world. Yet if this were all that there is to a belief - this mirroring relation 
to the world - then a belief's practical consequences would be no more 
than an afterword to the prior question of its truth or falsity. One would 
judge its truth vertically, as it were, comparing its content to the state of 
affairs that it represents, whereas its horizontal relation to its behavioral 
implications would be a secondary and separable matter. This vertical 
way of imagining the relation of truth claims to facts makes the relation 
between truth claims and their practical contexts seem completely acciden-
tal. Conceiving truth in this way makes it appear that there is little sense in 
saying say that some truths are inextricably intertwined with grammatical-
ly engendered capacities in our speaking, simply because this picture of 
comparing propositions to reality bypasses these practical considerations 
entirely. Even if certainties are initially accepted as the result of coming to 
participate in a practice, it seems that they must eventually be measured 
by their correspondence with fact, independently of their practical roles. If 
beliefs cannot be separated from practice and independently judged, they 
cannot be truth claims at all. They would then lack the sense - i.e., the 
cognitive significance - that consists in their having an independent rep-
resentational content. 
Sensible as this might sound, though, we cannot always separate the 
affirmation of our beliefs from capacities engendered in our practice, as the 
correspondence model of truth would suggest. The correspondence con-
ception of truth expresses a completely formal notion; it provides no sub-
stantive or specific guidelines about what facts mean, what corresponding 
with external reality amounts to, or what using the world to judge truth 
claims entails. The requirement that truth be objective, at least in the bare 
sense that it must correspond to what is the case in reality, says nothing 
about the requirement that this correspondence relation must be estab-
lished by one or another method. It seems to entail certain methods only 
because we confuse a whole nest of formal concepts with substantive 
understandings of how we are to determine a truth claim's correspondence 
with the world. For example, the positivistic view that all truth claims 
must be amenable to objective verification by the facts plays on a hidden 
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ambiguity in what is meant by "objectivity" and what is meant by "facts. 
"In the bare sense of these words, all truths, simply because they are true, 
state facts. They all characterize reality. They all depend on what is objec-
tively the case, but only because the meaning of objective reality, fact, etc., 
is in this case a purely formal notion. Anything might count as an objective 
fact in this sense. If there are moral truths, they correspond with objective 
moral facts; and if there are mathematical truths, they state objective math-
ematical facts. But in the formal sense, the requirement that truths must 
state facts tells us nothing about what is to count as a fact or what needs to 
be done to ascertain the facts. Given the formality of the requirement that 
truth claims state objective facts, the range of what might qualify as a fac-
tually significant judgment lies completely open. 
The problem is that the notions of objectivity, factuality, reality, etc. also 
have substantive meanings, and these are easily confused with the formal 
sense employed in the requirement that all truths must state objective facts. 
lrl the more substantive sense of objectivity, for example, an objective truth 
is one to be judged impersonally as a description - that is, according to 
facts that can be presented as givens. But this notion of an objective truth 
characterizes only those statements that can be judged directly or indirectly 
according to information (factual input) that can be unproblematically pre-
sented to us, as a fait accompli, as it were. To see whether an objective 
description is true, therefore, one compares the descriptive content of the 
claim with material that is acceptable as a report on the world. Whether 
these reports come to us in the form of perceptions or in terms of other 
given information does not matter: the key point is that the telling thing in 
the judgment of descriptive claims is supplied for us, or given to us, irre-
spective of attitudes that might otherwise influence what we regard as 
true. This is the idea that lies behind positivism's claim that the facts that 
count (i.e., empirical facts) are always posited or given facts. That is the 
important thing, not simply that truth claims must be adjudicable empiri-
cally but also that the ground of this judgment rests in the immediate 
acceptability of something given. 
The same point is contained in the commonplace idea that true beliefs 
must correspond with facts. Facts too are givens; they have been settled, 
they are reliable, they represent the grounds for inferential claims - all 
because facts in this sense are understood as being accepted before any 
judgments are rnade. The facts are what they are, so to speak, irrespective of 
what we might make of them or conclude from them. That is a grammati-
cal remark that defines one important sense of the word fact. Thus, when 
we speak of interpreting the facts, we do so only because we can draw a 
distinction between what can be taken for granted - the facts - and what 
lies with us to make of these facts. The facts here are objective precisely 
because they are not in dispute and can be taken for granted, as if they 
were simply presented as a report from the world. What cannot be taken 
for granted in this way necessarily requires some interpretive judgment 
from us, and this obviously is why we distinguish such issues from objec-
tive matters, calling them subjective issues, interpretive questions, personal 
assessments, etc. These matters can never be resolved without weighing 
the facts, seeing them in a certain light, or holding them in a particular per-
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spective. Judgment is required is such cases because issues of truth and 
falsity cannot be rested on mere reports of what is the case. 
Evaluative judgments are the clearest examples. They differ in kind 
from scientific hypotheses because their truth cannot be rested on the refer-
ence to something given. That is why we so often say that the world of 
value is subjective, while the world of science is objective. Here the word 
"world" is being used in a particular way. The scientific or purely descrip-
tive world of facts requires nothing of the believers sensitivities or capaci-
ties for understanding themselves in relation to others. Scientists, as scien-
tists, simply receive factual deliverances into their thinking, allowing these 
facts (ideally) to determine their empirical judgments. In this world the 
scientists' moral capacities have little relevance. Yet when it comes to eval-
uative or moral judgments, people are asked to see naked facts in a dis-
cerning way that requires such capacities, for which the would-be believer 
is responsible. For without such capacities for moral discernment the 
world of value does not open up. To enter that world - to see moral reali-
ties - we have to supply the perspective in which the given facts of any 
situation are no longer simply given but given in the light of their practice-
altering moral implications. 
This much, I think, is reasonably clear. What is less clear is that the con-
cept of a fact, defined as something that is acceptable, reliable, or simply 
given, also allows for us to speak of moral facts in certain circumstances. 
Certainly, when moral or evaluative facts of a case are not in dispute -
when we can rely on moral seeing as surely as we can rely on ordinary 
perception - then some moral judgments might qualify as facts in this 
sense. These moral facts are not, of course, scientific facts since they regis-
ter on us only as moral insights. Yet they are still facts to the extent that 
they have the same kind of immediate acceptability as anything else that 
can be taken as a given. If there are such moral facts, then some other 
moral judgments can be rested on them as argumentative premises. This 
may sound strange to those who think that there are no settled facts when 
it comes to morality, axiology, teleology, etc. But for those who realize that 
our capacity to enter into moral judgment depends on some underlying 
agreement in our moral reactions, it does not sound unusual at all to speak 
of our agreement on this fundamental level in terms of the recognition of 
moral facts. 
Thus, as an example, one might describe Mr. Smith's reprehensible 
treatment of Mr. Jones quite naturally as a fact, as long one anticipates no 
doubts to arise by saying so. Sometimes such things are plain, and when 
they are, we can speak of them as facts. Or to take a sharper example, 
Raimond Gaita has recently argued that racists fail to realize the moral fact 
that those whom they denigrate are fully human. He claims that racists 
cannot imagine that cares and concerns of those they denigrate - e.g., 
about the loss of a child - can go as deep in them as they do among them-
selves. The inability to see in others the kind of humanity that deserves 
respect is the characteristic feature not only of most forms of racial preju-
dice but of genocidal attitudes as well. To argue on inferential grounds 
that we all have this kind of humanity is otiose, simply because it takes the 
point at issue as something that requires an argument. Its truth is more 
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immediate than that, and so Gaita quite naturally characterizes this atti-
tude as a mistake over moral facts. 7 He characterizes their error in this way 
because he expects his readers to agree with him, not because he can show 
skeptics error of their ways by providing them with more adequate 
descriptive data for drawing inferences. Thus, instead of even attempting 
such an argument, he simply expects us to recognize a non-discriminating 
regard for others as something so basic that its truth is a condition for 
moral discernment. That the humanity of people elicits our moral regard 
needs no justification. All people possess humanity in this sense. And this 
fact defines the moral world. 
My point here is not to raise issues in moral philosophy; it is simply to 
show that the concept of an intuited fact is sometimes related more to what 
can be taken for granted than to a descriptive truth intuited through the 
senses. This use of the word "fact" as something taken for granted varies, 
naturally, according to whatever is accepted as a matter of course in a cer-
tain community of discourse. Thus, it cuts across the usual factual (objec-
tive and scientific)/non-factual (subjective and evaluative) distinction. But 
it too has its basis in grammar.8 
Let us return for a moment to Wittgensteins discussion of certainties. 
We can see that there are truths that require something other than an infer-
ential judgment from logically prior or more certain facts. Judgment in 
such cases is not deliberative at all; conviction arises out of the learned 
activity in which a wordless certainty is held in place by an agreement in 
form of life(OC, 358-59). I have already said that we are anything but 
detached from such certainties. We are involved with them to the extent 
that we have come to rely on them as the operative background for think-
ing, and our conviction that they are true is the consequence of this 
reliance, not a product of objective judgment (OC,162, 204). Nor could it be 
the product of such judgment, since being certain about such things 
belongs to everything that we have come to know as a normal, rational, 
outlook on life. Thus, in the absence of specific reasons for doubt, we 
could not subject them to critical review without unhinging our capacity 
to settle anything. For this capacity depends on an indefinite range of 
background assumptions that serve us as a ground; and these assumptions 
cannot, just like that, be rendered dubious merely by being questioned 
(OC, 247, 257, 307). On the contrary, knowing how to utilize reliable 
grounds for vetting our various beliefs is a form of practical mastery, a 
knowing how that silently contains everything that we cannot help but to 
trust if we are to go on reasoning as we do. 
Here we do not learn what is reliable simply by trusting authorities, as if 
the authorities were in a position to make better objective judgments than 
we are able to make. No one is in a position to make objective judgments 
without an enormous number of unarticulated assumptions that simply 
stand fast (OC,105, 143, 162). The people who we think of as authorities ~ 
teachers and parents ~ are in the same logical position as we are with 
respect to the possibility of resolving the doubts of their children. The dif-
ference between teachers and children is that teachers already know how to 
make responsible judgments, and it is that capacity that they communicate 
in teaching children what to rely on and what to suspect. The implication 
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of this, once again, is that the believing which lies at the bottom of our rea-
soning belongs inseparably to something practical. This is what we do in 
thinking (OC 110, 128-29, 196,204,358). 
Is there any way of knowing that the myriad of assumptions in this back-
ground are in fact true? No, not if this means checking their truth against 
anything that is more certain, or which might serve us more reliably as a 
ground of judgment. Yet there is no need to check on these truisms. 
Indeed, there is ordinarily no SC/lse even in attempting it. The role which 
these truisms are afforded by our activity of judging immunizes them 
against the abstract possibility of doubt. To doubt one of these truisms 
means to have a reason for doubt, so that what is otherwise a certainty is in 
specific circumstances lifted out of the realm of what must be taken for 
granted. Without such specific reasons for doubt, the claims that 
Wittgenstein described as certainties occupy a role in our thinking that 
holds them fast. 
But what if some people share a form of thinking that differs radically 
from our own? What if they do not even understand some of the things 
that we take for granted, and vice versa? In such cases, there simply might 
be no common ground for the objective resolution of the issues, since we 
surely cannot show the non-believer in such cases is making a mistake (OC 
75, 155-58). If we manage somehow to come up with grounds for our cer-
tainties, we will be arguing in a circle, as these grounds will reflect the very 
kind of thinking that we want others to share in the first place (OC , 609-
611). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein offers a few hints about the possibility of 
persuasion in such cases, but these thoughts are left largely undeveloped 
(OC, 262, 612). I think that persuasion has to do with engendering those 
capacities which, when developed, tend to hold convictions in place as 
something like a certainty. But the one thing that is clear about persuasion 
in this context, though, is that it has nothing to do with evidence. When one 
searches for evidence for something that is ordinarily certain (e.g., to use 
against non-believers), the whole notion of a supportive ground begins to 
crumble. One no longer knows what it would take to settle a doubt, and if 
something that one said did seem to settle a doubt, one would not know 
how or why. To see this point is to realize that the capacity to participate in 
various forms of judgment is the logical source of certainty." 
IV 
We thus come back to the view that there are claims that are held in 
place by the weight of the whole process of making empirical judgments, 
rather like the axis of a gyroscope is held fast by its rotary motion (OC 144, 
152, 248). But this is true of a large number of differing kinds of judgment, as 
there are non-empirical claims that are secured in the same way. These are 
factual claims of a sort, meaning that they too can come to occupy the same 
logical role that certainties have. Although we have little or no choice 
about our certainties, we can do without these higher-order, non-empirical 
certainties. To see how and why this is the case is tantamount to realizing 
the overall point at stake in this essay - that understanding the sense of a 
belief, including the kind of belief that it is (moral, empirical, etc.) depends 
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on a clear view of the essential connection that it has with our practice. 
To clarify this insight, suppose that we to tum to religious beliefs, which 
Wittgenstein also once described as Aregulative ideas. H) Several passages 
in On Certainty suggest that the credibility of religious claims depends on 
the same kind of practical agreement that underlies our certainties (OC, 
106-107, 239-240, 243). We have little or no choice about our certainties, 
however; they seem part and parcel of our ability to think at all. But we do 
have a choice about our religious beliefs, since our general capacities as 
rational people are unaffected by religious convictions. Thus, people 
might or might not come to share in a religious life, so that their beliefs 
acquire the stability of intuitive judgments, just as wordless certainties are 
held in place by less variable ways of thinking and living. I have no objec-
tion to saying this, but I do not want to leave the analysis of religious or 
regulative beliefs at this. Both of these beliefs have a distinctive kind of 
sense, and this is connected to what might be called their grammar. 
Understanding the sense of a certainty means seeing it as something that 
we have acquired in the practice of making judgments and that we have no 
reason to doubt, or even to formulate. Understanding the sense of a reli-
gious belief means seeing it as something that, if it is to become acceptable, 
must acquire a similar relation to practice. 
Both sorts of belief - religious beliefs and certainties - occupy norma-
tive roles in the thinking of those who affirm them, and understanding 
their meaning means understanding this role. This role determines their 
sense, giving them the peculiar force of regulative ideas, so that the full 
understanding of their import has more to do with their behavioral impli-
cations than it does with their supposedly descriptive content. After all, 
one grasps the role of a certainty simply by using it as part of the inherited 
background against which other questions of trutll and falsity are subject-
ed to judgment (OC, 94). That is what it means to understand it in accor-
dance with its logical status, according to the sense it bears as a truism. 
That is why it is so strange even to articulate such assertions; one conforms 
to their sense simply by going on with other matters in the practice of what 
we understand as reasonable thinking. And everyone does the same. That 
is what understanding their sense means - acting without doubt about 
them as one devotes attention to other more questionable matters. 
Understanding the sense of a regulative or religious idea is essentially 
no different. The meaning of such a belief is a function of the role that it 
plays as a governing idea, and this gives it a force or a point that it would 
not otherwise have. With certainties, however, we already share in the 
rational practices that they anchor; but with religious beliefs, a believer 
must come to share a new system of judgment before the relevant sense of 
being capacitated can arise. Thus it is absolutely essential to a religious 
belief that it carry the point of a transformative idea, and that its affirma-
tion entail conforming oneself with this aspect of its meaning. Religiously 
speaking, this is why believing makes the believer into a "new being"; for 
one must abide in the sense of a religious belief, conforming one's heart to 
the practice that the belief regulates, to be a believer at all. 
We often lose sight of this point because religious beliefs look so much 
like metaphysical descriptions that we almost invariably judge them as if 
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their affirmation carried no more force than the affirmation of any meta-
physical description. But if Wittgenstein is right, such beliefs are not repre-
sentational claims (descriptions) at all, since their sense is due entirely to 
their role in defining religious paradigms of judgment. This role is sug-
gested by what religious beliefs depict as being the case, and most believ-
ers announce their faith by affirming this representation; and yet the sense 
of the belief is carried only by the regulative function that this depic60n 
serves. Thus, if a religious description of facts does not further believers' 
compliance with the regulative role of the belief, the facts that it supposed-
ly states are represented differently until it is properly tmderstood - i.e., 
tmtil the affirmation of its apparent form as a depiction agrees with its 
grammatical sense as a regulative idea. Admittedly, such a view runs 
against the grain of most of what passes for a philosophical understanding 
of religion's essential content. In the effort to find a correct religious repre-
sentation of the world, most of us forget that correctness here is not mea-
sured by objective standards but by compliance with the grammatical role 
that these representations play. As a result, those who are anxious to find 
the descriptive truth in religion bracket the relevance faith's life (wherein 
the regulatory significance of its claims is illustrated) when it comes to the 
judgment of its claims. All this is reinforced by an overly simplistic view of 
what it means to speak of religious practice and its relevance to belief. 
The reason for this latter point is not hard to understand. When we 
think of religious belief in relation to practice, we usually think of fairly 
gross or obvious forms of behavior such as keeping the Sabbath, reading 
the scriptures, donating to charities, making oracular confessions, and per-
forming any number of other public and easily identifiable acts. We usual-
ly do not think of more subtle behaviors that we use to identify the deepest 
and most characteristic attitudes of believers, such as their willingness to 
forgive, their admiration for impartial love, their peculiarly resilient hope-
fulness, etc. Sometimes we speak of such inward or spiritual attitudes of 
the sort that can be easily hidden from the world, but it would be a mistake 
to think of these inner dispositions as being entirely private, as if they 
never showed themselves in any sort of behavior. For even the irmer atti-
tudes of faith must be recognizable in one's behavior, just as any inward or 
mental process must be outwardly identifiableY It is just that the identifi-
cation of these irmer attitudes is much more involved, and requires more 
discrimination, and takes more time to notice than the recognition of the 
contrasting forms of behavior that we describe as outward. Religious atti-
tudes can still be shown in silent films, for example; the only difference 
being that outward behavior of believing can be shown in a few frames, 
but the inner attitudes of genuine faithfulness takes considerable more 
time to display. 
The important point is that religious belief is tied to some behavior 
despite the fact that the performance of various overt religious acts does 
not in fact make one a believer. Hence it is true that there is no necessity 
that believers must go to church or participate in certain rituals or wear 
certain clothes to show their faith; what counts is that the transformation 
that believing intends goes deeper than that, affecting believers inward 
attitudes by altering the attitudes wherein they find themselves. Such 
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inward changes are not inferentially derived from the belief in God; they 
are inherent in the belief itself, properly understood as a regulative idea. In 
suggesting that religious beliefs are essentially related to practice, that is all 
that I meant - but it is an important point. The tie that exists between 
believing and what characterizes a persons self-relationship, the inner life 
that is hidden beneath gross forms of behavior, is a logical consequence of 
what it means to believe. Thus, when believers affirm the content of their 
belief without exhibiting any changes in their self-reflection, we can be sure 
that they do not believe at all. They may say that they believe, but then the 
absence of those changes that we expect from the acceptance of a regula-
tive idea shows us that their behavior belies their words. 
The New Testament makes this abundantly clear in the case of 
Christianity. Jesus utters woes against the Pharisees for cleaning the outside 
of the cup (being outwardly religious) but failing to clean the inside (being 
truly religious )(Matthew 23:34). The implication is that the Pharisees are 
hypocrites who pretend to believe but lack the inner dispositional transfor-
mations that characterize genuine belief. They make only an outward show 
of complying with religious teachmgs but know nothing of the thoroughgo-
ing compliance that believing in God requires as a point of logic. We find 
the same thing in the book of James, where the author says that those who 
profess their belief but who do no good works to back up their claims have 
only a dead faith Games, 2:17-26). They too may say that they believe, but 
their practice bears none of the identifying works - i.e., the behavioral 
manifestations of belief - that we expect from true believers. Here we 
have to make the same distinction that we made above, separating the 
works that are the identifying consequences of belief from those that create 
nothing more than a show of faith. But as long as this difference is clear, 
James' remark about the relation between faith and works constitutes a 
grammatical claim. The belief that never manifests itself is dead not simply 
because it lacks obvious manifestations in outward practice, but because it 
lacks the inward consequences of that characterize the heart of faith. 
From a philosophical point of view, this last point is critical. Believing 
that a religious doctrine is true logically entails conforming to the belief as a 
regulative idea. To believe without this subtle, inward or deep compliance 
is to miss the sense of believing altogether. The reason is simple: the 
behavioral changes made in this inward domain of subtle practice explain 
wlmt it means to believe. The implications of this grammatical point are far-
reaching. If one considers only the cognitive content of a belief, holding in 
abeyance the effort to comply with it as a regulative idea, one loses sight of 
the belief's point. One no longer focuses on the behavioral entailments of 
the belief, but abstracts the belief from the only means of clarifying what it 
means to adopt it. All that remains is a caricature of belief, which anyone 
who understands the force of the belief as a regulative idea will immedi-
ately recognize as a travesty of misunderstanding. 
The conceptual point here does not apply only to religious beliefs. 
Think of someone who believes that something, say eating meat, is 
immoral, and yet at the same time betrays none of the characteristics that 
we expect from one who takes such a moral stance. She makes a show of 
professing the evils of meat-eating, but never avoids eating meat except in 
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public. Never does she feels guilty for this, nor show any of the disposi-
tional signs of tmly complying with this moral ideal. Does she believe in 
fact? Or is her profession of belief an empty show? At most we can say 
that she would like to believe but has yet to commit herself. Perhaps she is 
still struggling inside. Perhaps not. But how do we know any of this? We 
know this in the same way that we know when a religious person is being 
hypocritical. We recognize the lack of conviction from her behavior, that 
is, from seeing that her life has not been fully transformed by telling conse-
quences of thinking that meat-eating is wrong. 
The same applies to children who have yet to learn what it means to be 
moral. They may say "that's bad" when they recognize an action as one 
that their parents would disapprove of. But as long as th children are only 
imitating their parents verbal reactions, they do not yet fully understand 
what it means to make moral judgments. What is missing when this hap-
pens? The children are morally undeveloped, to be sure; but we only 
know this because we can see that they lack the complex forms of behavior 
that we expect to find in those who are morally sensitive. They might not 
yet exhibit any of the features of remorse, for example. Because that is 
missing in their behavior, we say that they do not fully understand the 
point of morality, or that they do not really believe, all because their lives 
shows too little of the behavioral transformation that is the logical correlate 
of belief. 
With moral claims, the logical tie that exists between affirming a belief 
and following its behavioral implications is not hard to accept; we already 
know that such beliefs have a prescriptive force. We know that this pre-
scriptive force, moreover, is not an added overlay on top of a descriptive 
moral meaning. It is constitutive of the claims meaning and therefore 
inseparable from it.12 Yet saying that a moral belief has this kind of force is 
simply another way of saying what I have been saying all along: to affirm 
these claims at all, one must affirm their force as regulative ideas - and that 
means altering the relevant way in which one thinks and lives. That is 
what makes moral beliefs moral in the first place - the normative or regu-
lative role that gives them their point. A similar kind of force belongs to the 
meaning of other regulative beliefs - psychological principles, aesthetic 
standards, policy statements, etc. To know what any of these claims 
mean, one has to understand the force that they carry by virtue of the role 
that they play in shaping our behavior in judging. That force is disclosed 
in the behavior that shows what it means to affirm these ideas, even when 
these judgments are announced in contexts that have only an accidental 
relation to the role to which grammar assigns themY 
If this is correct, then the supposition that one can, as it were, detach the 
cognitive content of a regulative claim from its behavioral implications is 
deeply mistaken. Supposedly one isolates this content from a claim's 
behavioral ramifications in order to judge it reasonably, independently of 
its effect on oneself. The detachment that this requires is the opposite of 
what understanding requires. Since one cannot consider the religious 
belief that God exists without appreciating this belief's force as a regulative 
idea, one cannot understand the point of believing in it without bringing 
its regulative implications into view. Apart from that, the grammar that 
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determines what the concept actually means'" becomes unhinged, and the 
so-called cognitive meaning of the belief drifts further and further away 
from the practical engagements which reveal its regulative power. No one 
then can say what the point of such a belief is since it is no longer under-
stood as a regulative idea. Philosophers who sense that something has 
gone wrong often scramble to somehow reconnect this lost force by trying 
to build it into to a restated account of the purely descriptive or representa-
tional content of the God-idea. But the so-called representational content 
of this belief semantically strips away the force that the belief carries by 
virtue of its grammatical role. This stripping away is the very thing that 
enables one to judge the supposed cognitive content of the claim indepen-
dently of the personal practice required by faith. And yet apart from the 
transformations that express the regulative role of a religious claim, there is 
no telling what the claim is supposed to mean because one no longer knows 
what kind of belief is at issue. The essential point expressed in the words of 
the belief has disappeared.1' Yet that is exactly what philosophers who set 
out to judge the question of God's existence objectively attempt to do - to 
judge the matter without regard to those conditions which afford the belief 
its regulative role and hence its force. This approach makes about as much 
sense as it does to ignore the prescriptive force of a moral claim in order to 
deal with the logically prior question of its cognitive content - which is to 
say, it makes no sense at a11. 16 
After all, if the behavioral implications of believing in God followed 
from the purely descriptive fact that God exists, as if by some sort of infer-
ence, then there would be nothing to stop pseudo-believers from saying 
that their faith is genuine simply because they mouth its words. Indeed, 
they could then say that they have believed the only thing that can be 
believed B the purely descriptive (cognitive) content of the claims at issue. 
Since there are few if any behavioral implications that belong to such 
claims, this would seem to make perfectly good sense. Logic, they might 
think, does not force them to do anything more. No complaint can be 
lodged against them for not living what they profess to believe. 
r am tempted to let the counter-intuitive nature of this last idea stand 
alone as a reason for rejecting it. Perhaps it is enough to point out that it 
flies in the face of New Testament warnings about the emptiness of believ-
ing without being inwardly renewed. But this in fact is not the only prob-
lem. We still have to ask how a loving disposition, for example, is sup-
posed to follow from the purely descriptive fact of God's existence in the 
first place. What is the connection between a purely objective, descriptive, 
truth and the change that believers are expected to make as a result of 
affirming it? Perhaps there is an answer here,17 but the natural theologians 
who believe that there is an answer here face the job of showing just how 
the behavioral, practical, or life-transforming consequences of believing are 
to be brought about. They cannot say that these consequences follow from 
the nature of the belief itself, for to say this would be to admit what I have 
been saying all along, that these beliefs have a regulative force built into 
their logic. 
Finally, even if we could consider all beliefs apart from the grammatical 
entailments that give them their force, we would lose the ability to distin-
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guish between kinds of belief. We could not speak of there being different 
kinds of truths and senses of reality, requiring different kinds of discern-
ment, since the question of factual truth would be logically cut off from the 
grammatical ingrained roles that we rely on in making these distinctions. 
How is it, after all, that we are able to distinguish historical claims from 
psychological judgments, or mathematical truths from moral insights? We 
can say that we know what such beliefs are about, but how does this tell 
us what kind of thinking is involved. We know what these beliefs mean 
only because we know how to comply with their grammatical implica-
tions, which extend to the kind of thinking that their acceptance presumes. 
If we did not have this sort of grammatical understanding to go by in dis-
criminating between different kinds of beliefs, the whole spectrum of 
everything that we call a belief would collapse into one homogeneous lot. 
We would then have only the content of beliefs to go by, so that all beliefs 
would be essentially representational. None would have the in-built regu-
lative significance that comes from being connected to differing forms of 
judgment requiring different means of compliance. 
So far I have argued that we affirm regulative beliefs, such as religious 
beliefs, by complying with their grammatical role in transforming the man-
ner in which one sees the world. The same might also be said to describe 
the affirmation of non-regulative or so-called objective beliefs. In recogniz-
ing such beliefs as objective beliefs, we comply with their grammar that 
governs their judgment, which requires us to rest their claim to truth on 
the facts - i .. e, on the unchallenged reports that we get from observing the 
world. Thus, when we realize that it is not up to us personally to establish 
their truth, we do so because we recognize the grammatical character of 
these assertions. We allow the facts to determine their truth, in other 
words, precisely because we comply with the grammar that governs their 
judgment. This sort of compliance does not lead us to change the manner 
in which we attend to experience, as it does in the case of regulative beliefs, 
but it still conforms to the form of judgment that is proper to an objective 
issue. In that sense, it still counts as compliance. 
In the end there is no getting away from the fact that in making distinc-
tions between different kinds of beliefs we are guided by grammatical 
norms, which give our words their meaning and our regulative beliefs 
their sense. There is no such thing as understanding any belief which is 
removed from this kind of practical knowing. 
Louisiana State University 
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4. This does not mean grammatically governed activities are absolutely 
immune from suggestions for change. With the knowledge gained from ani-
mal studies, for example, some of the things that we regard as sensible to say 
about animals might change, possibly for good reason. But, and this is crucial, 
such changes in what we say about animals must be teachable; that is, they must 
have a grammatical foundation provided by the careful observations and new 
information provided by animal studies. When conceptual changes are not 
provided for by changes in what we know, one side usually cannot under-
stand the other sides usage at all. 
5. In other words, if the claim at issue is a purely factual question, then, 
according to the view T am discussing, the importance of dream interpretation 
will depend on it, since otherwise that activity is practically pointless. If, on the 
other hand, the truth of this question cannot be determined independently of 
the insiders recognition of the appeal of the practice itself, then there is no logi-
cally prior cognitive issue at stake here. Instead, the issue about whether or not 
one is talking about anything real is thoroughly bound-up in the practice itself. 
The rest of what follows in this essay can be understood as a plea for the gener-
al sense of this latter kind of interpretation. 
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. 
H. von Wright, trans. by G. E. M Anscombe and Dennis Paul (New York; 
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11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G. E. M. 
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12. This is not to deny that the judgments that I am calling moral might 
presume factual descriptions in virtue of which these evaluations are made. 
But whatever the conditions might be for the application of a moral evaluation, 
the evaluation is itself inherently prescriptive. 
13. Perhaps I should not generalize too much about religion in this respect. 
As the editor of this journal pointed out, the acceptance of certain so-called 
primitive religions might not involve the same kind of transformation involved 
in the affirmation of Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. Maybe so, but it is 
difficult to sort out the relevant issues. For us there may be a clear difference 
between secular and religious ways of thinking. But for so-called primitives, 
there may not be a sharp distinction. For them no secular alternatives may be 
imaginable. Thus, there may be nothing for them to fall back on given the loss 
of what we might call a religious component in their view of the world, leaving 
them with no secular form of understanding to measure the transformation 
involved in changing from non-belief to belief. 
14. The implication here is that the apparent meaning of a religious claim 
might not be its real meaning. This is because the meaning of a certain reli-
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gious description (a certain picture) is given by its use rather than by its appar-
ent representational content. That this is so in the case of religious beliefs is 
one of the themes of Wittgensteins Lectures and Conversations (see pp. 63-4, 71-
2). 
15. However the characteristic manifestations of belief are explicated, they 
will show that assertion of God's existence carries a transformative force. I 
think that a new type of hope, for example, is built into a believers affirmation. 
This hope is neither built up nor justified in any of the normal ways we ground 
our hopes, and so it can be recognized in the curious resiliency of believers 
who refuse to despair in situations that are hopeless by all worldly standards. 
16. There may be some who would say that one can recognize that some-
thing is obligatory or right and still have no disposition whatever to comply 
with this judgment in any practical sense. This is not the place for a lengthy 
counter-argument, but I would suggest that when they deny the necessity of 
practical compliance, they either mistake outward compliance with inner dis-
position or they assume that moral judgments reflect essentially prudential 
strategies. 
17. The answer that believers need to make certain behavioral changes out 
of prudence, seeing the extent of God's power, is repugnant for at least three 
reasons. First, it assumes that self-interest governs the religious life; second, it 
covertly introduces the value of self-preservation into an argument that sup-
posedly begins without any evaluative presumptions; and third, it suggests that 
believers have an option of bringing their behavior in line with their beliefs. 
None of these is the case. If they bring none of their behavior into line with 
their beliefs, they do not believe religiously at all. 
